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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the emerging corporate problems of the 1980s, retiree insur-
ance benefits, has met face to face with an increasingly common corpo-
rate solution, Chapter 11 reorganization. The intersection of these two
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., Monmouth College, 1983; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1986. I wish to thank Gregory Barton, Clark Cunningham, Michael Green-
field, Frank Kennedy, Peter Letsou, Frank Miller, Robert Rasmussen, Robert B. Thompson, and
James J. White for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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phenomena first gained national attention with the July 1986 bank-
ruptcy filing of the LTV Steel Corporation.1 Immediately after seeking
bankruptcy court protection, LTV informed its 68,000 retirees that the
company temporarily would cease to pay the medical and life insurance
benefits that it had promised these former workers when they retired.2
Prompted by tragic stories of LTV retirees and their spouses who
were forced to postpone critical medical treatment, Congress enacted a
temporary bill that mandated continuation of payments to retirees dur-
ing LTV's reorganization. Even before Congress passed that measure,
union workers staged a labor strike at one of LTV's major steel plants
to protest the retiree benefits cutoff. LTV's management responded to
the strike by obtaining an order from the bankruptcy court allowing the
company to resume benefits during the pendency of the Chapter 11
bankruptcy.4
Although the immediate LTV crisis had passed, Congress eventu-
ally enacted permanent legislation intended to respond on a broader
scale to the problem of retiree insurance benefits in Chapter 11 reorga-
nizations. On June 16, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the new
legislation, which gives a special priority status to retiree medical and
life insurance benefits in Chapter 11 reorganization cases.' Most of this
legislation is contained in a new provision to the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code, section 1114.
Undoubtedly Congress believes that the nation's retirees can feel
secure now that section 1114 is part of the Bankruptcy Code." Unfortu-
1. See Melbinger, Retiree Medical Benefit Plans and the Impact of the Bankruptcy Filing
of LTV Corp., 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 641 (1987); see also Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1986) [hereinafter Commercial Law Hearing].
2. LTV's communication to its retirees took the form of a letter dated July 17, 1986. For a
copy of that letter, see Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 149.
3. Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-74 (1986). For some personal accounts of the
tragic circumstances faced by LTV retirees, see LTV Bankruptcy: Hearing on Oversight on the
LTV Corporation Filing for Bankruptcy Under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-51 (1986) [hereinafter LTV
Hearing].
4. For a copy of LTV's application to the bankruptcy court for permission to resume pay-
ments to retirees, as well as the order that allowed LTV to resume such payments, see Commercial
Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 154-67.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 79-138.
6. See Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat.
610 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988)).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988). The terms "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code" are used herein to
denote provisions in Title 11, United States Code.
8. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc. S6826-27 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Howell T.
Heflin) (remarking that "I am proud to have been part of an effort that will provide my fellow
Alabamians and other retirees across this Nation with a greater sense of security-that our Na-
tion's tremendous health care resources will be available to them in times of need").
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nately, section 1114 does little to increase the likelihood that retirees
will receive their promised health and life insurance benefits.9 Because
section 1114 applies only to Chapter 11 cases, the new legislation will
affect only a small percentage of cases in which companies become in-
solvent. 10 Although retirees now will receive a special priority for their
benefits claims in Chapter 11 cases," they will have no similar preferred
position in Chapter 7 liquidation cases or in nonbankruptcy
dissolutions. 12
More significantly, section 1114 may make it less likely that com-
panies with significant retiree benefits liabilities will be able to reorgan-
ize successfully.' 3 If retirees receive a greater relative entitlement in a
Chapter 11 case than in a Chapter 7 case, other unsecured creditors will
see their recovery in a Chapter 11 case reduced. Thus, these nonretiree
unsecured creditors may have an incentive to block a company's Chap-
ter 11 reorganization plan even when that company's going-concern
value would be realized best in the Chapter 11 forum.' 4 This rearrange-
ment of nonbankruptcy entitlements, even though for the benefit of a
sympathy-evoking class like retirees, undermines two of the most fun-
damental reorganization goals: equality of distribution and preservation
of going-concern value.' 5
Probably the greatest weakness of the new retiree benefits legisla-
tion is that it fails to address the real problem behind crises like that in
the LTV reorganization: the failure to prefund the corporate promise to
provide insurance benefits to retirees. If a company has not set aside
assets to cover its promise to retirees, a mere change in the Bankruptcy
Code cannot overcome that void. The new benefits legislation is not
broad enough to give any true protection to retirees, yet the legislation
alters the nature of the Chapter 11 bargaining process significantly
enough to make a reorganization less likely for any company with large
retiree benefits liabilities.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 151-97.
10. See Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Owner-
ship Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U.
CH. L. REV. 97, 102 (1984) (asserting that most businesses fail without filing bankruptcy petitions);
see also Retiree Health Benefits: The Fair-Weather Promise: Hearings Before the Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1986) [hereinafter Retiree Health Benefits Hearings]
(statement of Douglas G. Baird).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(2) (1988) (providing that "[a]ny payment for retiree benefits required
to be made before a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title is effective has the status of an
allowed administrative expense as provided in section 503 of this title").
12. Id. § 103(f) (noting that Chapter 11 provisions apply only to cases brought under that
chapter).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 158-79.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 186 & 188.
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This Article explores the problem of retiree insurance benefits.
Part II addresses what they are, when they vest, how they are funded,
and how they differ from pension benefits. Part III of the Article dis-
cusses the treatment of retiree benefits in bankruptcy before the enact-
ment of section 1114. Part IV then describes in detail the specific
operation of section 1114 and notes its significant ambiguities. In Part
V the Article shows why section 1114, though well intentioned, is a dan-
gerous and counterproductive statute that will increase significantly the
transactions costs in Chapter 11 negotiations and thereby decrease the
likelihood of successful reorganizations. Rather than giving retirees in-
creased protection for their nonpension benefits, section 1114 merely
damages an already fragile reorganization process. Finally, the Article
will propose that the best approach to the retiree benefits crisis is an
ERISA-type prefunding requirement.
II. RETIREE INSURANCE BENEFITS
A. Prevalence of Retiree Insurance
Probably the greatest single expense facing retired persons is the
cost of their medical care.'6 Even those workers whose pension benefits
vest fully before age sixty-five may choose not to retire early because a
large price tag attaches to medical coverage for older policy holders.' 7
Many companies, in an effort to encourage early retirement, have in-
cluded provisions for continued health and life insurance in their retire-
ment packages. 18
The increase in employer-sponsored retiree health benefits is a
tacit acknowledgment by the business world that Medicare's gaps are
often more significant than its coverage. For example, because of an in-
crease in early retirement programs, nearly forty percent of all current
retirees are not covered by Medicare. 9 Those retirees who have reached
16. Retirees who are over 65 and covered by Medicare but not by an employer-sponsored
health plan spend up to one-third of their income on additional coverage and out-of-pocket medi-
cal expenses. See Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 94.
17. Retired couples between the ages of 62 and 64 who are not covered by either Medicare or
by an employer-sponsored health plan spend an average of 56% of their Social Security benefits to
pay for their medical premiums. Id. at 97.
18. Currently, approximately 6.9 million retirees and their spouses receive employer-spon-
sored health insurance and an estimated 16% of the population over 68 receives supplemental
health coverage through private sector, employer-sponsored retiree health programs. THE ADMINIS-
TRATION'S PROPOSAL ON THE FUNDING AND TERMINATION OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSIONS PLANS 4
(Mar. 1987), reprinted in Proposals in the President's Competitiveness Initiative That Affect
Funding and Termination of Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12 (1987).
19. LTV Hearing, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Lynn Williams, international president,
United Steelworkers of America).
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the minimum age for coverage often need supplemental insurance to
meet the increasingly large deductibles and copayments that Medicare
requires.20
Although retiree insurance benefits were provided initially by only
the largest firms, such benefits are becoming more common in medium-
sized and smaller companies. More than eighty percent of the employ-
ees in large companies have been promised some form of postretirement
health coverage. Half of the employees in medium-sized firms can ex-
pect medical insurance benefits when they retire.21 Nearly seven million
current retirees and their dependents rely on employer-sponsored
health insurance, 22 and that number is expected to double in the next
ten years.23
B. Vesting: Timing and Contractual Existence
In the last few years, a number of retirees have been shocked to
discover that the postemployment insurance benefits they received
from their former companies could be taken away from them without
reason or warning.2' Such retirees have challenged their former employ-
ers in court on this issue with mixed results. When courts have found
that the insurance benefits were vested, they have held that the retirees
were entitled to recover from the employer the present value of that
benefit.25 When courts have determined that such benefits were not
vested, however, the retirees have been left with no recourse. 6
Although pension benefits and welfare benefits seem very much
alike, the rules that govern them are quite different. The requirements
for vesting of pensions are both highly regulated and very complicated
due to the advent of ERISA Because ERISA's vesting requirements
20. Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 96.
21. Id. at 98.
22. Id. at 94.
23. Page, Retiree Insurance Benefits: Enforcing Employer Obligations, 38 LAB. L.J. 496, 496
(1987).
24. For discussions of the problem, see generally Barnes & Mishkind, Retiree Health and
Welfare Benefits: Controversy over Their Duration, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 584 (1985); Note, Re-
thinking Yard-Man: A Return to Fundamental Contract Principles in Retiree Benefits Litigation,
37 EMORY L.J. 1033 (1988); and Comment, Retiree Welfare Benefits: ERISA, LMRA and the Fed-
eral Common Law, 20 AKRON L. REv. 455 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Bower v. Bunker
Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. See, e.g., United Auto. Workers v. Roblin Indus., 561 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
27. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); see also Note, The Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 539
(1975). See generally SuBcoM?,. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COis. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974 (Comm. Print 1976).
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do not encompass retiree insurance benefits, a the law concerning vest-
ing of these nonpension benefits has been more fluid and much less cer-
tain than comparable law covering pensions. One major difference
between the vesting of these two types of benefits is that the worker has
no entitlement to retiree insurance premiums until the actual point of
retirement.29 By contrast, ERISA mandates that after a minimum num-
ber of years on the job with the same employer, the employee becomes
entitled to the pension funds that the employer has accrued on the em-
ployee's behalf.30 Thus, if an employee terminates employment prior to
retirement, she is entitled to a portion of her pension benefits but none
of her retiree health insurance.31 The more fundamental distinction,
however, between pension vesting and retiree insurance vesting goes to
the character and existence of the promise itself. Under ERISA regula-
tions, a retiree who receives an employer-sponsored pension could not
find that her employer suddenly had terminated her pension. 2 Depend-
ing, however, on the terms of and the circumstances surrounding a re-
tiree insurance program, that same employer may have the legal right
28. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4726. The Report states:
The term "accrued benefits" [in ERISA] refers to pension or retirement benefits and is not
intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such as medical insurance or life insurance,
which are sometimes provided for employees in conjunction with a pension plan, and are
sometimes provided separately. To require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seri-
ously complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans whose primary function is
to provide retirement income.
Id. Although ERISA does not impose any vesting requirements on nonpension retirement benefits
plans, it does impose disclosure and reporting standards on retiree benefits plan administrators.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981) (stating that "welfare benefits do not become vested until a claim
arises that is payable under the Plan; these benefits are contractual rights subject to amendment
by parties to the Agreement").
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
31. Since Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 222 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), workers who
terminate their job with an employer before retirement do have some protection with respect to
their employer-sponsored group health insurance plan. COBRA enables employees who lose their
jobs or retire to purchase health coverage at the group rate for at least 18 months following termi-
nation of their employment. See id. § 10001(k)(2)(B)(i)(I), 100 Stat. at 224 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
162(k)(2)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. V 1987)).
32. In addition to mandating certain vesting requirements, ERISA includes plan termination
insurance requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Thus, even if an em-
ployer fails properly to fund its employees' pensions, the workers will be protected through the
federal Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC protects the retirement in-
come of more than 38 million workers and retirees in more than 112,000 private sector pension
plans. See LTV Hearing, supra note 3, at 56 (testimony of Kathleen P. Utgoff, executive director,
PBGC).
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to cease paying insurance premiums on behalf of retirees.33
The leading opinions in the area of retiree insurance vesting,
United Automobile Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc." and In re White Farm
Equipment Co.,s5 are both from the Sixth Circuit. Together these two
cases allow employers to terminate retiree insurance programs if the
documents that create the plan unambiguously reserve such a right.3 6
Any case in this area necessarily will be very fact-specific, even when
the employer has reserved a right of termination in a written plan docu-
ment. The Yard-Man and White Farm courts held that oral promises
made to retirees as well as surrounding circumstances creating an obli-
gation on the part of an employer may remove a right to termination
that the employer had reserved in writing.3 7
The vesting question is critical in the context of section 1114 be-
cause the new Bankruptcy Code section might not apply if a retiree
benefits program is terminable at will under state law.38 Arguably, the
language of section 1114(e)(1) which states that the debtor-in-posses-
33. See, e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Turner v.
Local 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
34. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
35. 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
36. In Yard-Man the court held that the employer unlawfully terminated the health and life
insurance benefits of its retirees upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1482-83. Although the court in Yard-Man held for the retirees, the opinion
emphasized that it was the intent of the parties in the collective bargaining agreement that led to
this conclusion. Id. at 1479-80. The Yard-Man opinion also created a presumption in favor of
vesting, absent language to the contrary-. "retiree benefits are in a sense 'status' benefits which, as
such, carry with them an inference that they continue so long as the prerequisite status require-
ment is maintained." Id. at 1482.
The White Farm case, unlike Yard-Man, involved retiree benefits that did not find their
source in a collective bargaining agreement. After White Farm filed a petition under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, it continued to fund retirement benefits. After a few months, however, the
company notified its retirees that the plan would be discontinued. When former employees and
their spouses sued for reinstatement of benefits, the bankruptcy court upheld the employer's right
to terminate the plan because language in the summary booklets describing the plan gave the
employer an explicit right to discontinue the plan. In re White Farm Equip. Co., 23 Bankr. 85
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982), rev'd, 42 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.
1986). After the district court reversed the bankruptcy court, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court and remanded the case to the bankruptcy judge. The Sixth Circuit held that parties may
reserve a right to terminate or modify welfare benefits plans and that "the legislature, rather than
the courts, should determine whether mandatory vesting of retiree welfare benefits is appropriate."
White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1193.
37. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479-80 (in interpreting the contract, courts must look to the
context in which specific language arose); see also White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1193 (in determining
whether vesting of retiree benefits was intended, courts may look to surrounding circumstances in
order to draw inferences or make presumptions on issue of terminability).
38. Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 62 (statement of Douglas G. Baird)
(noting that prior to the enactment of § 1114, if the employer had a contractual right to terminate
benefits under state law, the employer would have the same right in bankruptcy).
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sion "shall timely pay and shall not modify any retiree benefits" 9 re-
quires companies in Chapter 11 to continue retiree insurance benefits
payments whether or not those benefits were vested under state law.
Nevertheless, the resolution of the vesting issue under state contract
law may determine whether the retiree has an unsecured claim in bank-
ruptcy subject to special elevation in status under section 1114, or sim-
ply no claim at all.
C. The Funding Void
Even if retirees can prove that their insurance benefits are vested,
they cannot be certain that they will continue to receive them. Without
adequate prefunding, an unambiguously vested retiree insurance pro-
gram remains a promise whose worth is a function of the financial
health of the company that has made it. Just as with vesting, the vast
difference between corporations' funding of pensions and their funding
of retiree insurance is primarily a product of ERISA. With pensions,
ERISA mandates certain minimum funding levels so that even when a
company becomes insolvent, its pension obligations will be met.40 Be-
cause ERISA's funding requirements do not apply to retiree insurance
benefits, virtually all companies that provide these benefits treat the
cost of such programs as an annual expense. 4' There has been little in-
centive for companies to prefund nonpension benefits for retirees, espe-
cially because the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 removed the tax
benefits of such prefunding.4"
The failure of businesses to prefund vested retiree insurance bene-
fits may lead to a major financial crisis, with some estimates of total
unfunded retiree medical liabilities approaching two trillion dollars."
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (describing ERISA minimum funding
requirements). Even when a company fails to comply with the minimum funding requirements, the
PBGC will ensure that retirees receive their promised pensions. See supra note 32. When LTV
filed bankruptcy, for example, the company had underfunded its pension plan by about $1.7 bil-
lion. See LTV Hearing, supra note 3, at 59 (testimony of Kathleen P. Utgoff, executive director,
PBGC).
41. About 95% of businesses that provide retiree medical benefits pay as they go. See
Searfoss & Erickson, The Big Unfunded Liability: Postretirement Healthcare Benefits, 166 J.
AcCT. 28, 30 (1988).
42. See Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 110 (asserting that almost no
employers currently prefund retiree insurance benefits; the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 largely eliminated tax-favored funding options); see also Searfoss & Erickson, supra note 41,
at 29 (alleging that one reason companies do not prefund retiree medical benefits is that payments
to prefund such plans are not tax deductible, unlike excess contributions to a pension trust).
43. See Oversight Subcommittee Turns Spotlight on Retiree Health Plans, 40 TAx NOTs
1225 (1988); see also Melbinger, supra note 1, at 650 (estimating unfunded retiree benefits liabili-
ties for Fortune 500 companies alone at $2 trillion, even though the assets of those same companies
are valued at only $1.3 trillion).
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For some industrial companies, the present value of promised retiree
medical benefits may exceed the net worth of the company. Several
factors have contributed to the massive liability represented by un-
funded retiree benefits at many large businesses. First, annual increases
in the cost of health care consistently have outstripped the national in-
flation rate." Second, employees retire earlier and live longer than in
the past, a dual-edged increase in the length of time during which the
retirees will collect insurance benefits.4 Finally, in many manufacturing
industries the competition of imported products has led to a decline in
the number of active workers; in some companies the number of retir-
ees is twice the number of current employees.4
One development that may change the way companies treat retiree
insurance costs is the proposal by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) to force companies to recognize the total present value
of accrued nonpension retiree benefits on their balance sheets."s Previ-
ously, businesses could treat the cost of retiree medical benefits as an
annual expense.49 Enactment of the new FASB proposal, which would
be phased in over a five-year period, is likely to prompt diverse reac-
tions from the corporate world. Some companies may respond to the
change by an investigation into the practicability of prefunding bene-
fits.5 0 Other businesses may discontinue such benefits in the future ex-
44. See Firms Stunned by Retiree Health Costs, Wall St. J., May 24, 1988, at 41, col. 3.
45. In fact, health care costs have risen three times faster than the consumer price index over
the last 20 years. See Corporate Retiree Health Benefits: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?: Hearing
Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1984); see also Liebtag, Health
Benefits for Retirees, 164 J. AccT. 100, 101 (1987) (noting that in the early 1980s, health benefits
expenses increased as much as 16% annually).
46. See Searfoss & Erickson, supra note 41, at 30 (stating that the over-65 population is
expected to have increased by 63% by the year 2020); see also Retiree Benefits Protection Act of
1987: Hearing on H.R. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1987) [hereinafter Protection Act
Hearing] (statement of Joseph Patchan, Esq. and Susan B. Collins, Esq.).
47. See Searfoss & Erickson, supra note 41, at 32.
48. See generally id. at 30-39 (explaining the FASB proposal). If the FASB exposure draft is
adopted, it probably will become effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1991. Com-
panies' unrecorded liabilities for retiree benefits will be included on balance sheets under this pro-
posal. Recognizing these estimated future liabilities will reduce net income and even may cause
some companies to violate existing loan covenants. See CooPmnS & LYBRAND, ACCOUNTING FOR RE-
TIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: ADDRESSING THE BROADER BUSINESS ISSUES 1 (Mar. 1989).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. Although businesses have not yet been forced
to recognize their unfunded retiree benefits obligations as a balance sheet liability, since 1984 the
FASB has required that companies disclose in financial statement footnotes the costs of life insur-
ance for retirees and the costs of health care for retirees, surviving spouses, and dependents. Dis-
CLOSURE OF POSTRETIREMENT HEALTH CARE AND LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 81, § 6-7 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1984).
50. See Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 110 (stating that employer inter-
est in prefunding is increasing with the threat of the new FASB proposal).
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cept for retirees whose rights have vested already."
With or without passage of the FASB proposal, the problem of un-
funded retiree insurance benefits will become more severe in the next
several years. For many businesses that are faced with the prospect of
paying for promises they can no longer keep, a bankruptcy filing may
prove to be the only viable option.
III. RETIREE BENEFITS IN BANKRUPTCY BEFORE SECTION 1114
A discussion of the status of retiree benefits in Chapter 11 cases
prior to the enactment of section 1114 is complicated by at least two
factors. First, courts have distinguished between retirees whose postem-
ployment insurance benefits were included in a collective bargaining
agreement and retirees whose benefits were not part of a union con-
tract.52 Many companies in Chapter 11 will have retirees in both catego-
ries?5 Second, to the extent that retirees' benefits were part of a
collective bargaining agreement, the treatment of those benefits in
Chapter 11 cases was affected by the enactment in 1984 of Bankruptcy
Code section 1113.5" That section restricts the ability of a company in
Chapter 11 to reject a collective bargaining agreement.5
A. Salaried Retirees
Before the enactment of section 1114, retirees whose benefits were
not part of a collective bargaining agreement had no special priority to
a company's assets in a Chapter 11 reorganization. If they could show
that their benefits were vested, these retirees were eligible to file a
claim in the bankruptcy.56 Because any retiree entitlement to unpaid
past and future benefits was based on a breach of contract, it was an
unsecured claim.57 In other words, salaried retirees would not receive
any of their nonpension benefits until debts of secured creditors and
51. Id. at 111 (stating that new regulations that make providing retiree benefits more bur-
densome would encourage some employers who currently offer such benefits to terminate them).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 56-74.
53. See, e.g., In re McLouth Steel Corp., 23 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (deciding
that nonunion retirees were not denied equal protection by a Chapter 11 debtor continuing to pay
union retirees medical benefits while refusing those same benefits to nonunion retirees). The LTV
case involved both union and nonunion retirees. See Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 47
(statement of Herbert P. Minkel, Jr.).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 139-50.
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
56. A "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code is defined to include a "right to payment." Id. §
101(4)(A). Whether a right to payment exists will be a function of nonbankruptcy law. See supra
note 38; infra note 155.
57. See Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 64 (statement of Douglas G.
Baird).
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priority claimants were satisfied.5 8
Bankruptcy law dictated that prepetition unsecured creditors, such
as these retirees, not receive any distribution during the pendency of
the case.' Thus, although the retirees' nonbankruptcy entitlement to
nonpension benefits was to a stream of future payments, the claim of
each retiree in bankruptcy had to be reduced to a single figure. Each
nonunion retiree's bankruptcy claim would be an actuarially deter-
mined lump sum representing the discounted present value of the re-
tiree's promised future benefits.6 0 A salaried retiree's return from the
estate of a Chapter 11 debtor would be a function of how much value
the Chapter 11 plan provided for unsecured creditors or, if the company
was liquidated, how much money was left after the secured and priority
claimants were paid.
B. Union Retirees
Even before the passage of section 1113, retirees whose benefits
were part of a union contract with the company were probably in a
better position than their salaried counterparts. 1 Employees protected
by a union contract faced the risk that the Chapter 11 company might
reject unilaterally its collective bargaining agreement and thus trans-
form the union retiree's nonpension entitlements into a general un-
secured claim.6 2 Such a decision by the struggling company would be ill-
58. Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth a list of expenses and claims in bank-
ruptcy that are given priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the § 507
priority scheme is incorporated into that chapter's distribution provision. Id. § 726(a)(1). Ironi-
cally, the Bankruptcy Code nowhere says explicitly that secured claims must be paid before the so-
called "priority" claims of § 507, although the common law of bankruptcy is clear that secured
creditors can enforce their liens in full before priority and general unsecured creditors get paid.
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-57 (1979) (looking to state-law entitlements to deter-
mine property rights in bankruptcy).
59. See Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of Herbert P. Minkel, Jr.
and Prof. Lawrence P. King) (stating that "[t]he most difficult thing for managers of a debtor
corporation to rationalize and accept is the fact that claims arising prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition are prepetition claims and may not be paid without an order of the court").
60. See Page, supra note 23, at 501 (stating that under contract law, an employer's failure to
provide vested retiree benefits may result in a judgment equal to the total present value of retire-
ment benefits); see also Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 164-65 (testimony of Nathan B.
Feinstein) (making the point that funding LTV retiree benefits in a Chapter 11 plan would mean
accounting for discounted present value of such future benefits as part of the plan); cf. Levy v.
Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 969 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., concurring) (indicating that "[t]o the extent
that appellant proved a claim to future insurance benefits under the plan, the claim presumably
would be allowed in an amount based upon the cost of substitute health and welfare insurance
policies for the balance of the retirees' life expectancies").
61. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
62. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld the
ability of an employer to reject a collective bargaining agreement entered into prepetition. The
Court held by a 5-4 majority that the debtor had not committed an unfair labor practice when it
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advised in many cases, however, given the labor problems that inevita-
bly would follow. In one presection 1113 case, the bankruptcy court al-
lowed the debtor-in-possession to continue retiree benefits payments to
union retirees as provided in the union contract even though the com-
pany refused to pay those same vested benefits to salaried retirees. 3
The enactment of section 1113 made it more difficult for a Chapter
11 company to reject a collective bargaining agreement and therefore
made the difference between union and nonunion retirees more pro-
nounced. Under section 1113, management must make an offer to the
union to modify the contract before it seeks outright rejection." The
bankruptcy court may approve a rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement only after such a proposal has been made, the union has
failed to accept it "without good cause," and "the balance of the equi-
ties clearly favors rejection of such agreement." 5
Under at least one interpretation of section 1113, section 1114
would offer no independent benefits to union employees. LTV's attor-
neys, however, did not choose this interpretation. When LTV Steel filed
for Chapter 11, its lawyers did not believe that section 1113 prohibited
the cessation of retiree medical and life insurance payments that were
part of a collective bargaining agreement 6 even though section 1113
says that a debtor-in-possession is not permitted to "unilaterally termi-
nate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement" before
complying with the requirements of that section. LTV's argument was
that section 1113 protected only current employees, not retirees. 8 This
logic had been accepted by one bankruptcy court, in In re Unimet
Corp.," a year before LTV had filed. According to the Unimet reason-
ing, the basis for distinguishing between retirees and current employees
in section 1113 could be found in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of
America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.70 In that 1971 decision, the Su-
unilaterally abrogated the union contract. Id. at 527-34. A Chapter 11 company's ability to reject
executory contracts generally stems from 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988), which provides that "the trus-
tee [or debtor-in-possession], subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
63. See In re McLouth Steel Corp., 23 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1) (1988).
65. Id. § 1113(c).
66. See Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of LTV Corp.).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f) (1988).
68. See Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 107 (statement of LTV Corp.).
69. No. 685-00240, slip op. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 1985). The bankruptcy court's deci-
sion in Unimet ultimately was reversed in In re Unimet Corp., 842 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1988). The
Sixth Circuit held that § 1113(f)'s language prohibiting unilateral termination or alteration of "any
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement" did apply to provisions that benefited retirees. Id.
at 884.
70. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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preme Court held that an employer's mid-term unilateral modification
of retirees' benefits did not constitute an unfair labor practice because
the retirees were not "employees" for the purposes of section 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act.7 1 From this Supreme Court case, the
bankruptcy court in Unimet concluded that section 1113 was not in-
tended by Congress to protect retirees.2 The logic, in short, was that
section 1113 was designed to protect employees; retirees are not em-
ployees; thus, section 1113 does not prevent the company from termi-
nating retiree benefits, even if those benefits are included in a collective
bargaining agreement.
Although LTV could point to the decision in Unimet as precedent
for its interpretation of section 1113, the case law at the time of LTV's
filing was less than clear. About a month prior to LTV's bankruptcy
petition, in In re Century Brass Products, ' the Second Circuit held
that retirees entitled to collectively bargained-for benefits should be
characterized as "employees" for purposes of applying section 1113."' If
the Second Circuit was correct in Century Brass, section 1113 alone
should have prevented LTV's unilateral termination of benefits. If
LTV's actions were nothing more than a wrongful interpretation of sec-
tion 1113, then the independent benefit of section1114 for union retir-
ees is dubious.
71. See id. at 172. The Court noted that preservation of retiree benefits did not vitally affect
active employees, and that because retired workers had ceased doing work for hire, they could not
be construed as the type of "employee" within the meaning of the NLRA's collective bargaining
obligations. See id.
72. Unimet, No. 685-00240, slip op. at 7.
73. 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
74. See id. at 274-75. Specifically, the court in Century Brass held that when an employer
files a Chapter 11 case, the rights of retired workers "vitally affect" the rights of current employees
within the meaning of Pittsburgh Plate Glass and therefore the retirees should be construed as
"employees" for purposes of the NLRA's collective bargaining obligations. The court said that a
refusal of the union to negotiate a reduction in retiree benefits could "vitally affect" current work-
ers in at least two ways: (1) current workers would have to bear a much larger cost of the reorgani-
zation because of the high cost of retirement benefits; and (2) if the retirement benefits could not
be renegotiated, the company's reorganization could fail, leading to closure of the business and loss
of current jobs. See id. at 274. The court in Century Brass also acknowledged the inherent conflict
of interest between current employees and retirees with respect to the employer's reorganization.
That conflict of interest stems from the limited resources available to the reorganizing company:
any dollar applied toward promised retiree benefits is potentially one less dollar available for cur-
rent workers' salaries. Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that when a bankruptcy court deter-
mines that there is a conflict of interest between current workers and retirees, a separate
representative for retirees should be appointed by the judge. See id. at 275. Similarly, section 1114
empowers the court to appoint a separate representative for retirees when the court finds, after
notice and a hearing, that the union is not an appropriate representative for the retirees. See 11
U.S.C. § 1114(c)(1) (1988).
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C. The Stopgap Legislation
Although the public outcry over LTV's cessation of benefits caused
Congress to move quickly, a labor strike at one of LTV's plants
prompted the company to resume paying retiree benefits.7 5 Neverthe-
less, Congress passed a temporary measure designed to prevent a recur-
rence of the LTV situation while legislators worked on designing a more
permanent solution.76 The stopgap legislation, much simpler than its
permanent successor, provided that a company which files a Chapter 11
case after October 2, 1986, must continue to pay retirees any benefits
that were promised prepetition.7 The temporary legislation produced
only one litigated case which held that, notwithstanding the law, retiree
benefits could not be paid if those payments would reduce the collateral
of secured creditors.7 8
IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF SECTION 1114
A. Scope of Coverage
Section 1114 applies to Chapter 11 reorganization attempts, not to
Chapter 7 liquidations.7 9 Under section 1114, no claim for retiree bene-
fits is limited by section 502(b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code,8 0 which re-
stricts the amount of an employee's claim arising from the termination
of an employment contract.81 Although section 1114 took effect immedi-
ately upon enactment, it applies only to cases filed after the date of
enactment.8 2 For pending Chapter 11 cases, the stopgap legislation was
amended concurrently with section 1114 to give retirees of those com-
panies essentially the same protections granted by section 1114.e8
75. Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 158 (containing LTV Corp.'s application to
pay retiree benefits during the pendency of the Chapter 11 case).
76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
77. Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-74 (1986).
78. See In re Jones & Lamson Mach. Co., 75 Bankr. 208 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 103(f) (1988).
80. Id. § 1114(j).
81. Id. § 502(b)(7). Section 502(b)(7) provides that if an employee makes a claim for damages
resulting from the termination of an employment contract, the claim is limited to the compensa-
tion provided by that contract for one year following the earlier of the date of the employer's
petition or the date on which the employer directed the employee to terminate or the employee did
terminate performance under the contract. Id. The employee may collect, in addition, any unpaid
compensation due under the contract at the earlier of the above two dates. Id.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 note (1988).
83. Id. § 1106 note. The main difference between Chapter 11 cases covered by § 1114 and
cases that were pending at the time of § 1114's enactment is that in the latter set of cases, the
statute expressly incorporates the modification standard of § 1113(b)(1)(A) as the standard to be
used for modification of retiree benefits. For cases that are covered by § 1114, the modification
standard is virtually identical to that given under § 1113, with the exception that the § 1114 modi-
fication standard twice uses the phrase "necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor," id.
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Not all retirees are eligible for the benefits of section 1114. If a
retiree had a gross income of 250,000 dollars or more in the year preced-
ing the filing of the petition, the protections of section 1114 generally
would not apply.84 Such upper-income retirees can avail themselves of
the provisions of section 1114 only if they can demonstrate that they
are unable to obtain for themselves and their dependents insurance
comparable to that offered by the company on the day before it filed for
relief under Chapter 11. 85
B. Limits on Debtor's Ability to Modify Benefits
The thrust of section 1114 is that the debtor "shall timely pay and
shall not modify any retiree benefits" unless one of two conditions is
met. 6 The debtor can modify the benefits if there is a consensual ar-
rangement regarding modification between the debtor and the retirees'
authorized representative.8 7 Absent such a consensual arrangement, a
modification will be approved only if the debtor makes a proposal that
is rejected by the retirees' representative without good cause and the
court determines that the proposed modification is necessary to permit
the reorganization of the debtor, assures that all affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably, and is clearly favored by the balance of the
equities.8 This three-pronged standard for nonconsensual modification
of retiree benefits is intended by Congress to be identical to the stan-
dard currently governing rejection by Chapter 11 debtors of collective
bargaining agreements under section 1113. The Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee believed that it was important to use a familiar standard.8 9 Sen-
ator Howard M. Metzenbaum's comments on the final bill indicated
that the phrase "necessary for the reorganization of the debtor" should
be given the Third Circuit's interpretation.9" In Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America9 the Third Circuit de-
§ 1114(f)(1)(A), (g)(3), whereas § 1113 only uses the phrase once, see id. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
84. Id. § 1114(1).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 1114(e), (f), (g). "Retiree benefits" are defined in § 1114(a) to mean
payments to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or reimbursing payments for
retired employees and their spouses and dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death under any plan,
fund, or program (through the purchase of insurance or otherwise) maintained or established
in whole or in part by the debtor prior to filing a petition commencing a case under this title.
Id. § 1114(a).
87. Id. § 1114(f).
88. Id. § 1114(g).
89. S. REP. No. 119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987).
90. See 134 CONG. REc. S6825 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum).
91. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
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termined from legislators' remarks that a proposal to modify a labor
contract is "necessary to permit a reorganization" when it is essential to
the "goal of preventing a debtor's liquidation.""2 Senator Metzenbaum
added that the modifications ordered under the new legislation should
be "only those necessary to avoid liquidation.""3
Section 1114 provides alternative procedures for the appointment
of the retirees' authorized representative, depending on the status of
the retirees. For retirees whose benefits are covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, the labor organization that signed the agreement
acts as authorized representative unless that organization decides not to
serve or the court determines that different representation is appropri-
ate.94 When a labor organization is not the retirees' representative, the
court will appoint a committee of retired employees to serve as repre-
sentative for the retirees.95 If retirees' benefits are not covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement, the court, after notice and a hearing,
similarly will appoint a committee of the debtor's retirees if the debtor
seeks to modify or not to pay retiree benefits." Such a committee of
retired persons is granted all of the rights and duties of other creditors'
committees and has the power to enforce the rights of retirees with re-
spect to health and insurance benefits that the debtor seeks to modify.'
For a nonemergency motion to modify benefits, the bankruptcy
court must set a hearing for no later than fourteen days following the
filing of the application." The court must then rule on the motion
within ninety days following the hearing.99 Section 1114, however, also
permits the court to allow "interim modifications" of retirees' benefits
92. Id. at 1089.
93. 134 CONG. REc. 86825 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(c)(1) (1988).
95. Id. § 1114(c)(2).
96. Id. § 1114(d).
97. Id. § 1114(b)(2). Section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code enumerates the powers and du-
ties of a creditors' committee. Id. § 1103. These include the ability to employ professionals, consult
with the debtor concerning the administration of the case, investigate the acts and financial condi-
tion of the debtor, participate in the formulation of a plan, request the appointment of a trustee or
examiner, and perform "such other services as are in the interest of those represented." Id.
98. Id. § 1114(k)(1). The court is allowed a seven-day extension of this fourteen-day period
for commencing of the hearing "where the circumstances of the case, and the interests of justice
require such extension, or for additional periods of time to which the trustee and the authorized
representative agree." Id.
99. Id. § 1114(k)(2). The court may extend this 90-day time period "in the interests of
justice" if the debtor-in-possession and the authorized representative of the retirees agree. Id. If
the court fails to rule on an application for modification of benefits within 90 days of the com-
mencement of the hearing, or within the additional time period set by the court with the agree-
ment of the two sides, then the debtor may implement the proposed modifications pending the
ruling of the court on the original application. Id.
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after notice and a hearing if such modifications are essential to the con-
tinuation of the debtor's business or to avoid irreparable harm to the
estate."' 0
One of the main themes of the new legislation is that retiree bene-
fits should be modified in a Chapter 11 case only to the extent neces-
sary to avoid a liquidation of the debtor.101 Because a debtor's financial
condition may change substantially during the pendency of a Chapter
11 case, section 1114 provides that neither the debtor nor the retirees'
authorized representative is precluded from making more than one mo-
tion for a modification of benefits.10 Therefore, if the debtor finds that
after initial reductions in retirees' benefits levels, the company still
risks liquidation, it may apply to the court for further reductions. 10
Similarly, if a struggling debtor improves the company's finances during
the Chapter 11 case, the retirees' representative may argue that earlier
reductions in benefits levels are no longer necessary for the debtor to
reorganize successfully. 0 4
In the same legislation that created the new section 1114, Congress
significantly amended section 1129, which lists the prerequisites for
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. 05 Whereas section 1114 requires
that retiree benefits must continue at their full level absent formal
modification during the Chapter 11 case, the amendment to section
1129 provides that continuation of retiree benefits in the plan itself is
an independent prerequisite for plan confirmation. 0 6 New subsection
(13) of section 1129(a) says that the Chapter 11 plan must provide for
the continuation "of all retiree benefits [at their modified levels] ...
for the duration of the period that the debtor has obligated itself to
provide such benefits.'10 7 Thus, if the retirees' benefits had been modi-
fied during the Chapter 11 case to sixty percent of their original level,
100. Id. § 1114(h)(1). The hearing for interim modifications shall be scheduled "in accor-
dance with the needs of the trustee" and implementation of such interim changes "does not render
the motion for modification moot." Id. § 1114(h)(2)-(3).
101. See, e.g., id. § 1114(f)(1)(A) (allowing only "those necessary modifications in the retiree
benefits that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor"); id. § 1114(g)(3) (providing
that "such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor"); see also supra
text accompanying notes 89-92 (concluding that under the new legislation, modifications ordered
should be "only those necessary to avoid a liquidation").
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g) (1988).
103. Id. (stating that the trustee is not precluded "from making more than one motion for a
modification order governed by this subsection").
104. Id. (allowing the authorized representative of the retirees to apply to the court for an
order increasing those benefits modified by a court order or an agreement by the retirees, which
order shall be granted if the increase in retiree benefits sought is necessary to permit reorganiza-
tion, fair to all affected parties, and favored by the balance of the equities).
105. Id. § 1129.
106. Id. § 1129(a)(13).
107. Id.
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then the plan must provide for the continued payment to retirees at the
sixty percent level. The right to the remaining forty percent of the ben-
efits payments would be treated in the plan like general unsecured
claims. 0 8
C. Elevation of Retiree Claims to Priority Status
One of the most significant features of the new statute is that it
raises to the level of an administrative expense priority any payment
for retiree benefits "required to be made before a plan confirmed. . is
effective."'109 This feature means that retiree insurance benefits which
come due between the filing of the petition and confirmation of the
plan are subordinate only to the claims of secured creditors."10 The new
administrative priority of retiree claims is extremely significant for
lenders that extend prepetition unsecured credit to companies that
have large retiree insurance liabilities. These lenders now must face the
prospect of having their loans subordinated in Chapter 11 to the retir-
ees' claim for benefits.'
It is not clear from the language of section 1114 what portion of the
debtor's obligation to its retirees merits the administrative expense pri-
ority. The ambiguity on this point may be illustrated with the following
hypothetical. A company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, following proper
modification of its retirees' benefits during the pendency of the case,
ultimately has its plan confirmed. The total present value of retirees'
future benefits was one hundred million dollars when the case began.
The retirees' benefits level was modified during the pendency of the
case to seventy-five percent of its original amount, and later, this level
of benefits is agreed to in the proposed plan. Under the plan the general
unsecured creditors are to be paid fifty cents on the dollar for their
claims. The legislative history of section 1114 makes it clear that the
retirees would be entitled to 12.5 million dollars for the 25 million dol-
lars worth of benefits that they lost through the modification." 2 The
fact that the retirees already will receive seventy-five cents on the dol-
108. The legislative history of the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 makes
it clear that any amounts paid to the retirees as part of the plan or during the pendency of the
case cannot be subtracted from the amount to which the retirees are entitled as unsecured credi-
tors. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14. This concept was codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1114(i)
(1988).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(2) (1988).
110. Cf. supra note 78 and accompanying text.
111. See Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 85 (testimony of Prof. Lawrence King)
(contending that lenders are averse to extending credit prebankruptcy if they know that the bor-
rower is subject to a large claim for retiree medical benefits).
112. See S. REP. No. 119, 100th Cong., ist Sess. 6 n.2 (1987) (illustrating an example of the
calculation contemplated by § 1114(i)).
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lar for their benefits does not enable other creditors to "credit" those
seventy-five percent payments to the retirees' 25 million dollars general
unsecured portion of their claim. Thus, other unsecured creditors may
not reduce the retirees' return on that 25 million dollars below the fifty
percent level that other general unsecured creditors receive.
This example illustrates the ambiguity of the "administrative ex-
pense" character of the retirees' entitlements. If the estate kept current
on its seventy-five percent payments during the pendency of the case,
the retirees' claim to future seventy-five percent payments as part of
the plan cannot be called an "administrative expense," because there is
no longer any estate to administer following confirmation of the plan.
At the point of confirmation, the retirees' claim to seventy-five percent
payments in the future is merely the contractual obligation of the newly
reorganized company. General contract law, not the Bankruptcy Code,
governs the retirees' rights to those payments in the future.113
The case would be different, however, if the retirees had not re-
ceived all the agreed-upon seventy-five percent level of benefits during
the pendency of the Chapter 11 case. In this latter example, the differ-
ence between what the retirees were supposed to have received under
the modified benefits plan, and what the retirees actually did receive in
benefits payments during the pendency of the case, would seem to qual-
ify as an administrative expense for purposes of classification in the
plan. If, in the hypothetical situation, the case lasted two years, the
unmodified value of retiree benefits during these two years was four
million dollars, and the seventy-five percent modification was agreed
upon immediately after the Chapter 11 case was filed, the retirees' ad-
ministrative expense entitlement for the two years would be three mil-
lion dollars. If, during those two years, the retirees collectively received
from the debtor just two million dollars in benefits rather than the
three million dollars to which they were entitled following modification,
then the retirees would appear to have an "administrative expense"
claim for one million dollars at the point of confirmation of the plan.
The retirees also would have a general unsecured claim for one million
dollars, the amount by which the twenty-five percent modification re-
duced their one hundred percent entitlement of four million dollars.
The one million dollar administrative expense claim would represent a
payment that was "required to be made before a plan confirmed under
section 1129 of this title is effective," the touchstone for qualifying as
113. Once a plan is confirmed, § 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code vests in the debtor all of the
property of the estate free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors except those provided
in the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1988). Section 1141 also provides that the provisions of a
confirmed plan bind both the debtor and the parties entitled to property under the plan. See id. §
1141(a).
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an administrative expense under section 1114(e)(2). 114
The situation in which the case converts to a Chapter 7 liquidation
before any plan is confirmed poses the issue of what portion of the re-
tirees' past or future benefits claim qualifies as an administrative ex-
pense in the Chapter 7 case. It is not clear whether the administrative
expense classification applies only to the amount that should have been
paid during the Chapter 11 but was not, or to the full discounted pre-
sent value of the insurance benefits for the rest of the retirees' lives.
The general rule in converted cases, that administrative expenses of the
Chapter 11 case are paid only after administrative expenses of the
Chapter 7 case are paid, applies to retirees' claims.115 If Congress had
wanted to give retiree benefits a special priority in all bankruptcy cases,
then it could have added a provision to section 507 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which governs priorities in Chapters 11 and 7.11 The sections of
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as new section 1114, apply
only in Chapter 11 cases." Nevertheless, an administrative claimant in
a converted Chapter 11 case still comes ahead of general unsecured
creditors in the Chapter 7 liquidation;" 8 thus, it is useful to know what
priority the retirees can bring into the Chapter 7 case.
As mentioned earlier, section 1114(e)(2) provides that the category
of retiree benefits claims entitled to administrative expense status in-
cludes payments "required to be made before a plan confirmed. . . is
effective.""' 9 If, as in the majority of Chapter 11 filings, 10 no plan is
ever confirmed, the status of the retirees' claims is uncertain. An exam-
ple illustrates the problem. A company with significant retiree benefits
obligations files a Chapter 11 case, has its retiree benefits modified dur-
ing the pendency of the case to seventy-five percent of their original
level, and then converts the case to a Chapter 7 one year after filing.
During the one-year pendency of the Chapter 11 case, the retirees are
paid just sixty percent of their medical benefits rather than the sev-
enty-five percent to which they were entitled following proper modifica-
tion. When the case is converted, one possible reading of section
1114(e)(2) gives the retirees in the Chapter 7 case an administrative
expense priority for only the fifteen percent of benefits that they did
114. Id. § 1114(e)(2).
115. See id. § 726(b).
116. Section 103(a) provides that Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Bankruptcy Code apply in a
case under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13. Id. § 103(a). Section 507 is part of Chapter 5 of the Code.
117. See supra note 12.
118. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726(a) (1988).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 113 & 114.
120. See, e.g., LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKm. L.J. 99, 100 (1983) (finding a 26% overall success rate for
Chapter 11 debtors).
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not receive during the one-year pendency of the Chapter 11. Under this
view, the rest of the retirees' entitlement in the Chapter 7 case, namely
the twenty-five percent reduction of their benefits during the Chapter
11 and the full discounted present value of all their future medical ben-
efits, would be treated as a general unsecured claim. The attorney for
the retirees probably would argue for a second interpretation of the ad-
ministrative expense priority that attaches to retiree benefits under sec-
tion 1114. Under this view, the retirees' administrative expense claim
following conversion of the case to Chapter 7 would consist of the dis-
counted present value of these benefits at the level to which they were
modified during the pendency of the Chapter 11 case. Thus, if the pre-
sent value of retirees' future benefits at an unmodified level was one
hundred million dollars when the case began and there was a modifica-
tion during the Chapter 11 to a seventy-five percent level, the retirees'
administrative claim in the Chapter 7 case would be seventy-five mil-
lion dollars, less any amounts that actually were paid to retirees during
the Chapter 11 case.
The language and legislative history of section 1114 provide little
guidance on which of the two alternative interpretations should be fol-
lowed in the common situation when a Chapter 11 case converts to a
Chapter 7 case. The broader interpretation of administrative expense
that would be sought by the retirees has at least two arguments in its
favor. First, the language of section 1114 says that an administrative
expense priority attaches to "[a]ny payment . . . required to be made
before a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title is effective." '121
If a plan is never confirmed and therefore is never "effective," the lit-
eral language suggests that "any payment" would encompass all future
payments required to be made to retirees. The only event in section
1114 that would limit the amount of retiree payments which qualify for
administrative status, the confirmation of a plan, will never occur once
there is a conversion to a Chapter 7. Congress could have eliminated
this argument if it had added to the phrase "before a plan confirmed
. . . is effective" the words "or the case is converted or dismissed.' 122
Second, the retirees' argument for administrative expense priority is
bolstered by the general principle in bankruptcy that claims which are
not yet due and owing to the debtor are accelerated once the debtor
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(2) (1988).
122. Interestingly enough, Congress did provide for the possibility of dismissal, although not
conversion, in the conforming amendments that it made to the stopgap legislation as part of the
bill that was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. For cases that were pending at the time
of the enactment of § 1114 and therefore covered by the stopgap legislation, the amendment to the
stopgap legislation provides that the trustee "shall pay" benefits until "the dismissal of the case
involved" or "the effective date of a plan confirmed under section 1129." See id. § 1106 note.
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files a bankruptcy petition.12 3 Thus, even though the retirees were enti-
tled to a stream of future payments outside of bankruptcy, each re-
tiree's claim in bankruptcy would be for the discounted present value of
that stream.2 When the case converts, then the retirees could argue
that it is this full lump sum, and not just the insurance premiums
which were due during the Chapter 11 proceeding, that constitutes the
retirees' administrative claim in the converted case.
It is troublesome, however, to give retirees a larger administrative
claim than they were owed at the modified level during the pendency of
the Chapter 11, because such a windfall would operate in an arbitrary
fashion. The following example illustrates the arbitrary application of
the broad reading of the administrative expense priority. A company
with assets of one hundred million dollars has obligations to retirees for
future nonpension benefits totaling one hundred million dollars in pre-
sent value terms. This company owes two hundred million dollars to
nonretiree unsecured creditors. If the company filed a Chapter 7 case
first, without ever trying to sustain a Chapter 11 reorganization, both
the retirees and the other unsecured creditors would receive thirty-
three cents on the dollar.125 The same company might, however, at-
tempt a Chapter 11 reorganization even though the prospect did not
appear encouraging. If the company struggled along for three months in
Chapter 11 and then decided to convert to Chapter 7 without any at-
tempt to modify retiree benefits, 2 ' the retirees, under the reading of
section 1114 that is more favorable to them, would be entitled to one
hundred cents on the dollar, and the other unsecured creditors would
receive nothing.12 7 This polar difference in bankruptcy distribution
123. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-65 (1978) (stating that § 502 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code retains the traditional rule that bankruptcy accelerates the principal amount of all
claims against the debtor).
124. See supra note 60.
125. Even following the enactment of § 1114, retirees' claims for benefits in a straight Chap-
ter 7 case would be unsecured. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. Thus, under § 726(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, the retirees would share pro rata with the other unsecured creditors. See 11
U.S.C. § 726(2) (1988).
126. Section 1112(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the right to convert a Chapter
11 case into a Chapter 7 case unless the debtor is no longer in possession, the original Chapter 11
case was an involuntary one, or the case was in Chapter 11 because of a conversion motion that
was not the debtor's. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1988).
127. Under the proretiree reading of § 1114(e)(2), once the company filed Chapter 11, the
administrative expense priority would attach to the retirees' claim for promised future benefits. Id.
§ 1114(e)(2). Because after conversion to Chapter 7 a Chapter 11 plan would neither be "confirmed
under section 1129" nor "effective," then "[a]ny payment. . . required to be made" would be all
payments required to be made to retirees. See id. Thus, the retirees' § 503 claim in Chapter 7
would be for the full $100 million present value of their promised future benefits. Under § 726 that
administrative expense would have to be paid in full before general unsecured creditors received
anything. See id. § 726. The nonretiree unsecured creditors would, under that reading of §
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from the straight Chapter 7 case would result only because in the latter
case the hypothetical company decided to give Chapter 11 an ill-fated
try. Under a narrower reading of the retirees' administrative status, 2 '
the result in the preceding "quick conversion" example would give re-
tirees in the Chapter 7 case a priority only to any benefits payments
that were due to them during the three-month Chapter 11 period but
never paid. For the majority of their claim, the present value of all fu-
ture entitlements, the retirees would be treated on a par with the other
unsecured creditors in the distribution of the debtor's limited pool of
assets.
129
This more limited reading of retirees' administrative status seems
more consistent with congressional intent. Based on the legislative his-
tory of section 1114, it is probably fair to say that Congress did not give
much thought to what should happen to retirees' claims when a Chap-
ter 11 case is converted to a Chapter 7.1s0 Nevertheless, by placing the
priority provision in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code rather than in
the Code's general priority provision, section 507, Congress made an im-
plicit judgment not to give retirees a special priority in the pure Chap-
ter 7 case. Therefore, adopting a construction of section 1114 that limits
the priority that retirees receive in cases converted to Chapter 7 seems
consistent with the location in the Bankruptcy Code where Congress
chose to place the source of retirees' new elevated status.
D. The Problem of "Pipeline Claims"
A Chapter 11 filing brings another financial difficulty to retirees:
the so-called "pipeline claims." Pipeline claims occur when medical ser-
vices are performed prepetition for retirees of a self-insured company,
but the company does not receive the bill from the service provider un-
til postpetition."'5 Without legislation covering this situation, the bank-
rupt company can relegate the claim of the health care provider to
prepetition unsecured status.3 2 The provider, in turn, then could look
to the retiree to pay, because such providers typically have a contrac-
tual right of reimbursement against the retiree when the self-insuring
1114(e)(2), not receive a penny in the Chapter 7 distribution.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 120 & 121.
129. Id.
130. But see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
131. See 134 CONG. REc. 86825 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Howard M. Met-
zenbaum); see also Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 191 (statement of Joseph Patchan,
Esq. & Susan B. Collins, Esq.).
132. Because the services giving rise to the claim arose prepetition rather than postpetition,
the provider would not be eligible for § 503 administrative claim status, which attaches only to the
costs of preserving the postpetition bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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company fails to pay.18
To prevent retirees from being saddled with these prepetition
claims, an amendment to the stopgap legislation provided that the
debtor "shall pay" such claims of health care providers if the provider
can demonstrate to the bankruptcy court that it has a contractual right
of reimbursement against the retiree to whom it provided prepetition
134services. The legislative history to this provision makes it clear that
once the provider demonstrates a right of reversal, the debtor "mustimmediately pay the full amount owed to the administrator or health
care provider without waiting for confirmation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion.' 135 If the court finds no right of contractual reversal, the pipeline
claims of the health care provider are treated like general unsecured
claims. 36
One problem with this provision is that, although it addresses the
timing of payment to health care providers for such prepetition claims,
it does not appear to assign to such claims a specific priority among
claimants generally. These claims might be treated simply like un-
secured claims that are paid out early in the case by the debtor, with
the possibility that the provider later may have to reimburse the estate
if other unsecured claims arenot paid in full. Another possibility is that
these claims might have a status just below secured claims, to be paid
ahead of any other unsecured priority claims, including administrative
expenses.13 7 Alternatively, these claims might have a status equal to,
but not greater than, other administrative expenses. In this case, the
recipient of these arly pa yments may have a later obligation to the
estate if other administrative claimants are not paid in full. Neither the
statute nor the legislative hl tory offers much help on this issue, which
can loom very large. In LTV, for example, these prepetition pipeline
claims totaled thirty-five million dollars. 38
133. See Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 192 (statement of Joseph Patchan, Esq.
& Susan B. Collins, Esq.).
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106 note (1988). Although § 1114 itself does not address the issue of
"pipeline claims," the amendment to the stopgap legislation carries forward to new Chapter 11
cases the treatment given to "pipeline claims" in the stopgap legislation. See id.
135. 134 CONG. REC. H3489 (daily ed. May 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
136. Id.
137. For examples of two other instances in the Bankruptcy Code in which certain creditors
are given "superpriorities" that come ahead of even administrative claims under § 503, see 11
U.S.C. § 364(c)(1) (1988) (stating that when the trustee is otherwise unable to obtain postpetition
unsecured credit, the court may grant such postpetition lender a priority greater than § 503 sta-
tus); id. § 507(b) (stating that when a secured creditor's "adequate protection" subsequently
proves to be inadequate, the secured creditor is entitled to superpriority for the amount of
deficiency).
138. 134 CONG. REc. S6826 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum).
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E. The Intersection Between Sections 1113 and 1114
Section 1114 gives the same special status to retiree benefits that
are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement as it gives to those
benefits that do find their source in a union contract.'- 9 The only differ-
ence in section 1114's treatment of union as contrasted with salaried
retirees is the method of determining who shall be the retirees' author-
ized representative in the Chapter 11 proceeding.140 Section 1113, on
the other hand, is relevant only to retiree benefits derived from a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.4'1 Section 1114 thus intersects with section
1113 in the case in which the Chapter 11 debtor wishes to reject a col-
lective bargaining agreement that includes a provision for retiree
benefits.4
The following example illustrates the problems that can arise when
these provisions intersect. A debtor in a Chapter 11 case wants to mod-
ify its collective bargaining agreement by cutting current workers'
wages by thirty percent. The debtor does not propose any modification
of the benefits paid to retirees pursuant to the same union contract. In
this example the debtor would not have to contend with the modifica-
tion requirements of section 1114, but would have to show, pursuant to
section 1113, that the proposal treats all creditors "fairly and equita-
bly. '1 43 Even though section 1114 would not apply directly, the debtor
might argue that keeping the retirees' benefits intact while cutting cur-
rent workers' wages is "fair and equitable" because section 1114 shows
a congressional intent to give favored status in bankruptcy to retiree
interests. The problem with this argument is that it tries to compare
fundamentally distinct entitlements. Retirees who are owed future ben-
efits can be characterized rightly as pure "creditors," because they al-
ready have given to the company the consideration necessary to support
the company's promise to provide those benefits. 44 Current workers, on
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(b)(1) (1988) (providing that "authorized representative" shall be
defined in subsection (c) for persons receiving benefits covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment and in subsection (d) for persons receiving benefits not covered by such an agreement).
140. See id. § 1114(c), (d); see also supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 61-74.
142. Congress was aware of such an intersection, but expressly made no judgment whether a
trustee could seek modification of retiree medical benefits under § 1114 without first complying
with § 1113 when appropriate. See S. REP. No. 119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A), (c)(1) (1988) (asserting that before seeking an application to
reject a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor-in-possession first must make a proposal treat-
ing "all of the affected parties. . . fairly and equitably").
144. The Bankruptcy Code defines "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." Id. §
101(9) (A). "Claim" includes a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equi-
table, secured, or unsecured." Id. § 101(4)(A).
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the other hand, are not pure "creditors" with respect to their future
wages under a union contract because a prerequisite to the workers re-
ceiving the agreed-upon wage is performing the appropriate labor.145
Thus, current workers could argue that the debtor could not use section
1114 to defend such a proposal, because section 1114 showed only that
Congress intended to prefer retirees over other true unsecured creditors
and not necessarily over present employees.
In a variation of the hypothetical example, the employer in Chap-
ter 11 proposes instead, pursuant to section 1113, that current workers'
wages be cut by only twenty percent and that retirees' nonpension ben-
efits also be cut by twenty percent. The collective bargaining unit ac-
cepts this proposal and the formal contract rejection procedures under
section 1113 never come into play.146 This poses the issue of whether
the debtor and the collective bargaining unit may point to section 1113
and claim that the retirees are bound by the new arrangement.
Even before the enactment of section 1114, the retirees' rights
probably could not be diminished in this manner. Prior to section 1114,
the Century Brass court held that when a conflict of interest could be
shown between the interests of current employees and former workers,
retirees were entitled to have an authorized representative appointed
before any of their rights could be bargained away in a section 1113
setting. 4 ' Today section 1114 provides for a similar mechanism; it man-
dates the appointment of a representative for retirees, separate from
the labor union, when a party in interest can show the court that inde-
pendent representation of retirees is appropriate. 48 Furthermore, sec-
145. To the extent that current workers have performed services prepetition for which they
were never paid, then those workers would be "pure creditors" for the amount of prepetition salary
owed. Union workers' entitlements to future salary, however, would be part of their executory
contract with the debtor. Executory contracts are covered generally by 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988),
although collective bargaining agreements are a special form of executory contract provided for in
§ 1113. The classic definition of an executory contract is "a contract under which the obligations of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of
the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973). Because retirees have performed their obligations fully, their right to such benefits is not
governed by § 365. At least one commentator has confused the difference between the rights of
current workers to their future salaries and the rights of retirees to future retiree benefits. See
McNeil, The Failure of Free Contract in the Context of Employer-Sponsored Retiree Welfare
Benefits: Moving Towards a Solution, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213, 236 (1988) (concluding errone-
ously that vested nonunion retiree benefits are governed by § 365).
146. Section 1113(c)(1) makes it a prerequisite to a debtor's ability to reject a collective bar-
gaining agreement that such debtor first make a proposal to the authorized representative of the
employees that is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor, and assures that all credi-
tors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably. See 11 U.S.C. §
1113(b)(1)(A), (c)(1) (1988).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 73 & 74.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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tion 1113 implicitly allows the extrajudicial deal struck in the above
example between the debtor and the collective bargaining unit, but sec-
tion 1114 does not because the arrangement agreed to by the debtor
and the union attempts to modify retiree benefits without complying
with the requirements of section 1114. In short, no party can modify
retiree benefits in a Chapter 11 case without having to contend with the
provisions of section 1114. 14
In a final variation of the hypothetical, the debtor makes the same
twenty-twenty reduction proposal, but the labor union rejects it. The
debtor would like to avoid section 1114 completely and successfully re-
ject the collective bargaining agreement simply by meeting the section
1113 test of "fair to all parties," "necessary for a successful reorganiza-
tion," and "favored by the balance of the equities." The debtor may
achieve this result but may not avoid section 1114. The debtor could
never modify or reject its obligation to provide retiree benefits without
first complying with section 1114. On the other hand, if the bankruptcy
judge believed that the proposed package of reductions was, under sec-
tion 1113, "fair," "necessary," and "equitable," then the very same
judge probably would allow the retiree benefits reduction. The section
1114 test for modification of retiree benefits is, after all, essentially the
test contained in section 1113 for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement.
In practice, section 1114 will not change section 1113 negotiations
beyond the change already created by Century Brass. Because the tests
of sections 1114 and 1113 are so similar, the main effect of section 1114
on section 1113 is to codify the holding of Century Brass that when a
collective bargaining agreement provides for retiree benefits, the debtor
and the labor union lack the ability to bargain for reduction of those
retiree rights without the independent representation of retiree
interests. 150
149. Section 1114(e)(1) makes it clear that notwithstanding any other provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the debtor-in-possession or trustee "shall timely pay and shall not modify any retiree
benefits" unless they comply with the modification procedures set down in § 1114. 11 U.S.C. §
1114(e)(1) (1988). If it is clear that the debtor must reduce operating expenses to avoid a liquida-
tion, § 1114 does not answer how much of the reduction should come from current workers' wages
and how much should come from the benefits of retirees. Perhaps the language in § 1114(f)(1)(A)
that "all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably" would mandate a pro rata reduc-
tion as suggested in the text example, in which both union wages and retiree benefits were cut by
20%.
150. See supra notes 73, 74, and accompanying text.
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V. THE PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 1114
A. Undermining the Purposes of Chapter 11
In order to understand the fundamental flaws of section 1114, it is
useful to explore first the policies behind Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. One of the chief purposes of Chapter 11 is to preserve the going-
concern value of businesses that are worth more intact than liqui-
dated."' Chapter 11 provides a forum for resolution of competing, con-
flicting claims to a debtor's assets. During the process, individual
creditors are prohibited from collection actions that would otherwise be
allowed. 152 In Chapter 11 the creditors as a group, most often in con-
junction with the debtor's current management, can decide in a con-
trolled setting what is the optimal use of a debtor's assets. 153 The
ultimate goal in Chapter 11 is to use the company's assets in a way that
increases the size of the overall pie;' 5 the relative size of the pieces, for
the most part, has been fixed already by the state-law bargains struck
between the debtor and each individual creditor prebankrupty. 55
The problem with section 1114 is that it creates a set of Chapter
11-only priorities, a significant new source of transactions costs that
may force a case out of Chapter 11 even when the Chapter 11 forum
would provide the best vehicle for optimizing the total pool of assets
available for all creditors. 56 These transactions costs arise because what
is typically a two-party bargaining process over allocation of a firm's
going-concern surplus is transformed into a more cumbersome three-
party negotiation. Moreover, the reordering of creditor priorities man-
dated by section 1114 will create two sets of perverse incentives. First,
nonretiree unsecured creditors will have an incentive to see the debtor
company in Chapter 7 rather than in Chapter 11, even when Chapter 11
would provide the most efficient forum for deployment of the debtor's
151. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977) (stating that the premise of
business reorganization is that a company's assets are worth more as a going concern than they are
if sold for scrap); see also In re Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981) (contending
that "it was the intent of Congress . . . that a debtor be given one meaningful opportunity to
rehabilitate").
152. The Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988), prohibits any
act to collect a prepetition debt once a bankruptcy petition is filed. See Kleinsasser, 12 Bankr. at
455 (stating that the automatic stay "provides a debtor a breathing spell from his creditors to
attempt a reorganization").
153. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988) (providing procedures for acceptance of a plan); id. §
1129 (providing prerequisites for confirmation of a plan).
154. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 118 (suggesting that a goal of bankruptcy is to
deploy the company's assets as a single owner would).
155. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1979) (stating that absent federal pol-
icy to the contrary, property rights in bankruptcy are defined by state law); see also Eisenberg,
Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 953-59 (1981).
156. See infra text accompanying notes 158-79.
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assets. By the same token, a Chapter 11-only priority will give retirees
an incentive to keep a company in Chapter 11 even when the retirees
know that the assets of the business would be worth more if the com-
pany were liquidated under Chapter 7.157
B. Creation of New Transactions Costs
The following hypothetical example demonstrates how section 1114
creates new transactions costs in Chapter 11 cases involving companies
with retiree benefits liabilities. A company is worth four hundred mil-
lion dollars as a going concern and three hundred million dollars if liq-
uidated in Chapter 7. The firm has outstanding one hundred million
dollars of secured debt, three hundred million dollars worth of nonre-
tiree unsecured debt, and vested retiree medical obligations with a dis-
counted present value of two hundred million dollars. The company
also has stockholders, and many of these equity holders are current
managers of the business. This business decides to file a Chapter 11
case when it is unable to meet its debt obligations and its creditors be-
gin individual collection actions. In a presection 1114 world most of the
bargaining in the typical Chapter 11 case will focus on how to allocate
among the various classes of creditors the "going-concern surplus" to be
gained by use of the Chapter 11 forum. 5 8 In this example, the going-
concern surplus is one hundred million dollars-the difference between
the four hundred million dollars that the company is worth in Chapter
11 and the three hundred million dollars that it is worth in a Chapter 7
liquidation. Because the secured creditors in the example will be paid in
full regardless of whether the company reorganizes or liquidates, they
will not be concerned with allocation of the going-concern surplus.
157. The retirees' ability to keep a company in Chapter 11 against the wishes of other claim-
ants would seem to be much weaker than the ability of nonretiree creditors to block a Chapter 11
plan that did not provide them with payments at least equal to those under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion. Section 1112 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs conversion of a case from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7, provides that on request of a party in interest, the court may convert a case for "cause,"
including, among other things, "continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation." 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (1988). If this or any other showing
that merited a conversion can be made, the retirees would be statutorily powerless to prevent the
conversion even though the retirees themselves, with their § 1114 priority, would be much better
off in the Chapter 11 forum. On the other hand, disgruntled nonretiree unsecured creditors who
wish to see a case in Chapter 7 have the statutory ability to block a Chapter 11 plan if they will
not receive under the plan at least what they would obtain in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the same
company. The ability of individual creditors to insist on receiving in a Chapter 11 plan at least
what they would get in a liquidation of the same company is assured by application of the "best
interests of creditors" test, prescribed by § 1129(a)(7).
158. But see LoPucki, supra note 120, at 100-01 (contending that empirical research on
Chapter 11 debtors suggests that the size of the debtor, not the success of creditor bargaining, is
more likely to determine success in Chapter 11). See generally Baird & Jackson, Bargaining After
the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHL L. REv. 738 (1988).
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Thus, the two classes that will bargain over the surplus will be the
residual claimants, 159 the class consisting of all unsecured creditors in-
cluding retirees,160 and the equity holders.
Each of the two sides in this bargaining over allocation of the one
hundred million dollar going-concern surplus has some leverage over
the other. The unsecured creditors have on their side the "absolute pri-
ority rule" of section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.161 That rule says
that no class of unsecured claimants can be forced to accept a Chapter
11 plan that gives them less than a full payout unless all junior classes
of claimants receive nothing. Thus, any plan proposed by the current
managers that gives the stockholders any value at all can be blocked
statutorily by the "no" votes of the unsecured class of claimants.6 ' The
absolute priority rule would appear to give the residual claimants, here
the unsecured creditors, the right to insist on all of the going-concern
surplus. That result almost never will be reached in practice, however,
because the junior claimants, in this case the equity holders, have at
159. The "residual" claimants in any Chapter 11 case will be those whose claims are at the
margin-that is, those claimants who stand to win or lose depending on the fortunes of the firm. In
a solvent firm, the residual owners will be the shareholders. In a firm that is insolvent, the residual
owners typically will be the unsecured creditors. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 158, at 761-62.
160. As noted above, retirees are nothing more than unsecured creditors with respect to their
benefits claims. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60. It is conceivable that even in a presec-
tion 1114 case, retirees may have been classified separately in a plan from the other unsecured
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988) (indicating that a plan may place a claim in a particular
class only if such claim is "substantially similar" to the other claims of such class). Because of the
requirements of § 1129(b)(1), that a plan be "fair and equitable" and not "discriminate unfairly,"
however, it is unlikely that the other unsecured creditors would have had to accept a plan that
paid the retirees a greater percentage of their claim than the other unsecured creditors would
receive under the plan. Furthermore, if a plan were to propose such favored treatment for the
retirees in a presection 1114 setting, the nonretiree unsecured creditors could have invoked the
"best interests of creditors" test, see supra note 157, and prevented confirmation of that plan as
long as the extent of the retirees' favored treatment exceeded the going-concern surplus of the
company.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988).
162. One of the 13 prerequisites to the confirmation of a plan under § 1129(a) is that each
class of "impaired" claims has accepted the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(8). In the example, the nonretiree
unsecured creditors would be "impaired" under § 1124 because their nonbankruptcy entitlements
would be altered by the plan. See id. § 1124. "Acceptance" of a plan by a class of creditors requires
an affirmative vote by at least two-thirds in amount and one-half in number of the allowed claims
of such class held by creditors. Id. § 1126(c).
Even if a class of claims votes against a plan, the plan still can be confirmed under § 1129(b),
the "cramdown" procedures of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1129(b). For a plan to be crammed
down over the dissenting votes of a class of creditors, however, § 1129(b) requires that a number of
conditions be met. First, all of the other 12 requirements for the confirmation of a plan in §
1129(a) must be satisfied, including the "best interests" test discussed above. See supra note 157.
Furthermore, § 1129(b)(2)(B) says that no plan can be confirmed over the "no" vote of a dissent-
ing class unless the plan provides for that class to be paid in full or no junior class receives any-
thing. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988). This provision is the "absolute priority rule," discussed
above. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
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least two sources of leverage. First, all holders of interests in the debtor
are given the procedural right in Chapter 11 to force a judicial valuation
of the company in bankruptcy. 163 Such a valuation is costly and time-
consuming and reduces the going-concern surplus that otherwise would
be available to the creditor group.6 Second, many of the large equity
holders will be senior managers who have company-specific skills that
contribute to the very existence of a going-concern surplus.6 5 If the
residual claimants try to shut out the equity holders from any partici-
pation in the reorganized firm, these stockholder-managers can threaten
to take their skills elsewhere and thereby deplete a significant part of
the going-concern surplus.
If there is a going-concern value to be preserved, the debtor would
benefit by having these two sets of claimants strike a bargain. In a
world of perfect information and zero transactions costs, the residual
claimants and the junior creditors should come to a surplus allocation
agreement in any case in which the company is worth more in a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization than in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 66 In such a world,
the question would never be whether the company would have its
Chapter 11 plan confirmed, but rather how much of the surplus gained
in the Chapter 11 forum would go to the residual claimants and how
much would accrue to the junior owners.
In the real world of bankruptcy, however, information is often
scant, and transactions costs are staggering.1 67 The cost of such bargain-
ing over allocation of the going-concern surplus can be very high in-
deed. In a Chapter 11 negotiation, timing is often of the essence, and
163. The ability of a dissenting class of creditors to force a judicial valuation derives from a
number of different sources. First, application of the "best interests" test, see supra note 157,
requires that the court engage in a liquidation appraisal. Second, the requirement for cramdown
that the plan be "fair and equitable," 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988), with respect to each dissenting
class of claimant also may require a valuation. The "fair and equitable" test is thought to imply a
requirement that no class receive more than 100% of its claims. Thus, if claimants receive stock in
the reorganized company as part of the plan, the court may need to value the stock in order to
ensure that no claimant is being overcompensated for its claim. See Broude, Cramdown and Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441 (1984).
164. Broude, supra note 163, at 453 (stating that the threat of forcing a valuation "furnishes
a reason to give something to old equity, enough to gain its consent and avoid cramdown").
165. D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 616 (1985)
(stating that when impaired general creditors agree to a plan of reorganization that allows share-
holder participation, they are recognizing in part the value of shareholders' participation as man-
agers in the reorganizing company).
166. This conclusion follows from the Coase Theorem. See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2-15 (1960) (contending that in a world with zero transactions cost, original
entitlements will not affect how assets are deployed, because assets will be applied to their highest-
valued use).
167. The administrative costs of a typical Chapter 11 reorganization in which a creditors'
committee is appointed have been estimated at $100,000. See Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corpo-
rate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 135 n.13 (1986).
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prolonged negotiations reduce the chance of a successful agreement. 6 8
Furthermore, if the going-concern surplus is not significant, or if the
bargaining parties have different perceptions of the size of such surplus,
no bargain may be reached, and the company may liquidate in Chapter
7.19 In short, Chapter 11 negotiations are delicate processes that take
place in the shadow of that statute's procedural rules.170 If negotiations
break down and the statutory rules actually are invoked, the game may
be lost already.'"
The enactment of section 1114 complicates these delicate Chapter
11 negotiation processes and exacerbates the problem of transactions
costs. In the same example of a company with a one hundred million
dollar going-concern surplus, the secured creditors once again will not
be players in negotiations over the going-concern premium. And, once
again, the equity holders will have two sources of leverage to make a
claim for their share of the one hundred million dollar surplus. Because
section 1114 creates a new priority for retirees in Chapter 11, the stat-
ute adds a distinct third party, the retirees, to the reorganization nego-
tiations. No longer are the retirees and the other unsecured creditors in
an identical priority position. With the creation of a Chapter 11-only
priority, section 1114 introduces a completely separate, and arguably
more complex, form of bargaining over the allocation of any going-con-
cern surplus that may exist in the Chapter 11 forum.
This new form of bargaining is more complex not only because
there are three sets of players instead of two, but also because the retir-
ees' new-found priority may be reduced in part, either voluntarily or
through court-ordered modifications. Unlike the secured creditors, who
are indifferent to a threat of conversion to a Chapter 7 case, the retirees
may be willing to sacrifice some of their preferred position in a Chapter
11 in order to avoid the possibility of a Chapter 7.
Each set of players in this new form of bargaining, the retirees and
the nonretiree unsecured creditors, has its own unique leverage. Chap-
1J 168. See Broude, supra note 163, at 441 (stating that "in an arena where timing is often
more important than the ideal result, the delay caused by invocation of the cramdown power is
likely to result in harm to all").
169. See Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 540 (1983) (noting that because senior classes can give up value to junior classes,
juniors are inclined to demand even more, thus increasing "the tension created by the uncertainty
of value").
170. See D. BAIRn & T. JACKSON, supra note 165, at 616 (observing that "[p]arties always
negotiate against a background of legal rules, in bankruptcy or out").
171. See id. at 617 (stating that "the whole structure of Chapter 11 is designed to ensure that
parties bargain with one another and that there is not a full-blown valuation"). See generally E.
WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS (1986)
(discussing the fact that judicial valuation is a very expensive activity that the drafters of the Code
sought to avoid if at all possible).
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ter 11's "best interest of creditors" test provides the leverage that the
nonretiree unsecured creditors enjoy;11 2 no creditor can be forced to ac-
cept a plan of reorganization that provides the creditor with less than it
would receive in a liquidation.17 3 Because the nonretiree unsecured
creditor is on equal footing with retirees in a Chapter 7 but not in a
Chapter 11, it will be difficult for a Chapter 11 plan that provides for
continued retiree benefits to meet the "best interests" test, unless the
going-concern surplus is so large that it exceeds the present value of the
retiree benefits. The chief leverage that retirees enjoy in bargaining for
a bigger piece of any going-concern surplus is section 1114 itself. That
statute says in subsection (g) that no party can force any reduction in
retiree benefits except to the extent that such modification is "neces-
sary to permit the reorganization of the debtor . . ".., Thus, retirees
can contend in their bargaining with other unsecured creditors that the
retirees need not accept any reduction in benefits greater than that
specified by the statutory standard.
The question then becomes how much reduction in benefits nonre-
tiree unsecured creditors can insist to the court is "necessary to permit
a reorganization." One possible reading of the modification standard of
section 1114(g) starts with the presumption that Congress intended the
retirees to be paid in full for their benefits before general unsecured
creditors receive a penny because Congress elevated retirees' claims to
the level of administrative expenses. Under this approach, the judge
would refuse to modify retirees' benefits until the point when the con-
tinued payment of full benefits to the retirees made it impossible for
the company to secure any postpetition credit and to realize any cash
flow.
On the other hand, the judge making this decision cannot ignore
the power that the "best interests" test bestows upon nonretiree un-
secured creditors. Section 1114 does not change the fact that disgrun-
tled unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11 always have the ability to
block a plan of reorganization unless they receive at least as much in
the plan as they would receive in a liquidation of the business. 75 Be-
172. See supra note 157.
173. Id.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g) (1988).
175. See supra note 157. Note that for purposes of the "best interests" test, the analysis of
how much unsecured creditors would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation must take account of the
fact that a conversion to Chapter 7 typically would bring an increase in the amount of unsecured
claims, thereby reducing the return of unsecured creditors. See Broude, supra note 163, at 449. For
example, secured creditors are likely to receive less in a Chapter 7 foreclosure on their collateral
than they would in a Chapter 11 plan. Id. Furthermore, leases that are assumed by the debtor in
Chapter 11 may be rejected in Chapter 7, leading to an unsecured damages claim by the other
party. Id. To the extent that the judge accounts for this probable increase in the amount of un-
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cause unsecured creditors will be treated on a par with retirees in a
Chapter 7 liquidation, it is unlikely that a Chapter 11 plan which pro-
vides for continued payment of retiree benefits will give general un-
secured creditors as much as they would receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation."' 6 The ability of unsecured creditors to block a plan of reor-
ganization under certain circumstances may define the phrase "neces-
sary to permit a reorganization" under section 1114(g). In other words,
a judge may say that retiree benefits must be modified only to a level
which would ensure that unsecured creditors receive as much in the
plan as they would in a liquidation, thus stripping them of their ability
to block the confirmation of a plan.
If a judge had accurate information about the value of the business
as a going concern versus its liquidation value, the judge's use of the
above standard to determine section 1114(g) modifications would en-
sure that disgruntled unsecured creditors could not force any ill-advised
Chapter 7 liquidations. It is doubtful that any judge will have such in-
formation. More likely, the judge will be forced to endure a parade of
valuation experts whose conclusions about the company's projected
worth will coincide with the interests of those who employ them. 1' No
matter what the judge decides, needless expense and litigation will have
been created by the injection of just another piece of special interest
legislation into the Bankruptcy Code.17
8
The relatively few successful Chapter 11 cases typically result from
skillful negotiations in which the players' common interests in a suc-
cessful reorganization predominate over their conflicts of interest.179
Even if both the retirees and the unsecured creditors agreed on the size
of the Chapter 11 surplus, each side would wish to bargain for itself a
relatively larger portion of that surplus. In the presection 1114 world
where retirees had the same position in a Chapter 11 case as other un-
secured creditors, there was no need for this additional source of strate-
secured claims in the Chapter 7 setting, the bargaining leverage given to nonretiree unsecured
creditors by the "best interests" test would become less powerful.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 180-87.
177. Cf. Commercial Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that during the Chapter 11
case in In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986), the creditors' committee,
union, and debtor hired three actuarial firms whose estimates of the present value of retirees'
vested medical benefits varied as much as five-fold).
178. See Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 85 (statement of Prof. Lawrence King)
(noting that "[t]he more that priorities are included in the Code and the more that special groups
are placed ahead of other groups, the more difficult it becomes for a company in financial difficulty
to get the necessary finances to work out its problems").
179. Cf. Broude, supra note 163, at 441 (stating that "the risks of failure to reach a settle-
ment are so great, and the possible negative impact of the imposition of the cramdown powers so
significant, that the cramdown power is used more as a threat than as a club actually employed in
confirming a plan of reorganization").
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gic game-playing that will be inherent in a system that creates a new
dissimilarity of interests between the two sides.
C. The Problem of Perverse Incentives
In addition to creating the new transactions costs described above,
the enactment of section 1114 gives certain Chapter 11 players incen-
tives that are contrary to the underlying goals of the reorganization pro-
cess. First, section 1114 changes the incentives of the nonretiree
unsecured creditors. In a presection 1114 setting, these creditors would
have an incentive, once their debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, to see
the debtor reorganize as long as they thought that the company would
be worth more as a reorganized going concern than it would be worth
liquidated under Chapter 7.180 With the enactment of section 1114,
however, the nonretiree creditors' desire to see the company in a Chap-
ter 11 will not be necessarily a function of whether they believe that the
company would be worth more in a Chapter 11 than in a Chapter 7.
Instead, the desire of nonretiree unsecured creditors to see the company
reorganize will be influenced by how much their retiree counterparts are
willing to reduce their insurance benefits.
The facts of the previous hypothetical illuminate this point. A
debtor company in Chapter 11 is worth four hundred million dollars as
a going concern and three hundred million dollars if liquidated in a
Chapter 7 case;' 81 the debtor has one hundred million dollars of secured
180. This conclusion assumes that the unsecured claimants as a group would reap the bene-
fits of at least part of the going-concern surplus. Because the unsecured claimants are the residual
claimants in the hypothetical, this result seems probable. See supra note 159.
It also should be noted that unsecured trade creditors who continue to do business with the
Chapter 11 debtor may have incentives to keep the debtor in Chapter 11 whether or not the debtor
is worth more in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 7. These trade creditors may believe they are better
off with the profits they will make through continued business with the debtor while it is in Chap-
ter 11, even if they believe that the debtor in fact has no going-concern surplus and is probably
worth more liquidated in a Chapter 7 case.
181. The examples so far have assumed that Chapter 11 is the best vehicle for preserving the
going-concern value of a firm in bankruptcy. There is, however, no statutory reason why, following
a conversion of the case to Chapter 7, some or all of the company's going-concern value cannot be
preserved. In other words, it is technically possible in a Chapter 7 liquidation to have the company
sold intact with the proceeds of the sale constituting the Chapter 7 estate against which the
debtor's creditors will satisfy their claims. One of the duties of the Chapter 7 trustee is to "collect
and reduce to money" the property of the estate, See 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1988), but nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code mandates that the trustee sell the property of the estate on a piecemeal basis. In
fact, § 721 contemplates that the trustee may continue the operation of the business for a limited
period in Chapter 7 "if such operation is in the best interest of the estate and consistent with the
orderly liquidation of the estate." Id. § 721.
If going-concern values could be realized just as efficiently in a Chapter 7 as in a Chapter 11,
one reason why most reorganizing companies still would choose the Chapter 11 forum is because in
Chapter 11 the presumption of the Bankruptcy Code is that current management remains in place.
See id. § 1107 (providing that the debtor-in-possession shall have all of the rights and duties of a
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debt, three hundred million dollars of nonretiree unsecured debt, two
hundred million dollars of retiree obligations, and a class of stockhold-
ers. With or without section 1114, the secured creditors would receive
their one hundred million dollars off the top, whether or not there was
a successful plan of reorganization. In a presection 1114 world, both re-
tiree and nonretiree unsecured creditors would bargain with the share-
holders over allocation of the one hundred million dollar going-concern
surplus available through the Chapter 11 forum. Even if the sharehold-
ers managed to bargain for a full fifty percent of that surplus, leaving
fifty million dollars for the residual claimants, the nonretiree unsecured
creditors would still have an incentive to see the company reorganize in
Chapter 11 rather than liquidate in Chapter 7. The nonretiree un-
secured creditors would prefer such a result because with a fifty-fifty
split of the Chapter 11 surplus, they still would receive ten cents more
on the dollar in a Chapter 11 reorganization than they would in a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation.""2
The enactment of section 1114 created a new state of affairs. The
previous hypothetical with the same debtor and creditors illustrates the
problem. For this example the level of retiree insurance benefits is not
trustee serving in a case under this chapter); id. § 1108 (providing that the trustee may operate the
debtor's business). In a Chapter 7 case, on the other hand, an independent trustee automatically is
appointed to run the business and to decide how best to realize value for the creditors, whether
through a going-concern sale or a piecemeal liquidation. See id. § 701 (providing for the interim
trustee appointed immediately after Chapter 7 filing); id. § 704(1) (providing that the duties of
trustee include "collect[ing] and reduc[ing] to money the property of the estate for which such
trustee serves").
It also has been suggested by at least one commentator that Chapter 11 provides the optimal
forum for realization of going-concern value because of the relatively high information costs inher-
ent in an attempted Chapter 7 sale of an ongoing business. See generally Roe, supra note 169, at
538. In a Chapter 11 plan, the debtor's current creditors, who already possess significant informa-
tion concerning the likelihood of the company's rehabilitation, in effect buy the company based on
their belief that the business is indeed worth more as a going concern than it is broken up. See
Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1250-54 (1981). The
problem with a Chapter 7 sale of an ongoing business is convincing third-party buyers unfamiliar
with the company's operations that they should pay a premium for the firm's assets sold as a unit.
But see D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 165, at 603-05 (arguing that although third parties may
undervalue a firm's going-concern worth, they just as easily might overvalue it).
182. In a Chapter 7 case the nonretiree unsecured creditors would receive 40 cents on the
dollar ($300 million minus $100 million for secured creditors equals $200 million to be divided
among the holders of the $500 million total of unsecured claims). In Chapter 11 the unsecured
creditors would receive 50 cents on the dollar ($400 million minus $100 million for secured credi-
tors minus $50 million for equity equals $250 million to be split among $500 million worth of
unsecured claims). The bargaining costs between the residual claimants and the shareholders
would reduce the Chapter 11 premium by that amount, but would not make Chapter 7 the pre-
ferred choice unless the transactions costs in the Chapter 11 exceeded the amount of the going-
concern surplus, $100 million.
The above figures assume that courts would accept the more limited reading of retirees' ad-
ministrative status under § 1114(e)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
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reduced during the pendency of the Chapter 11. After four months, the
debtor-in-possession proposes a plan of reorganization. The plan pro-
vides that secured creditors will be paid in full at a total cost of one
hundred million dollars, retiree insurance benefits will continue to be
paid in full at a total discounted present cost of two hundred million
dollars, nonretiree unsecured creditors will receive thirty cents on the
dollar in cash, and equity holders will receive stock in the new company
with a total present value of ten million dollars. Even if the nonretiree
unsecured creditors had accurate information and knew that the debtor
would be worth four hundred million dollars as a going-concern and
three hundred million dollars if liquidated piecemeal, that class of un-
secured creditors would block the plan and insist on some portion of
the going-concern surplus.18 3 They would have the incentive to block
the plan because in a Chapter 7 case the retirees and the unsecured
creditors each would receive forty cents on the dollar,"" which is
greater than the thirty percent return that the Chapter 11 plan pro-
vided for the nonretiree unsecured creditors.
Only if the retirees in the above example are willing to accept a
reduction in their medical benefits, or the court forces such a reduction,
will the other unsecured creditors have an incentive to see the debtor
reorganize in the Chapter 11 case. Both statutory routes to modification
of retiree benefits will involve some form of transactions costs, either
through bargaining or judicial valuation."8 5 Although the nonretirees'
perverse incentive to see a company in Chapter 7 may in some cases be
overcome, section 1114 will have done its damage already by creating a
baseline of Chapter 11 entitlements in which nonretiree unsecured
creditors may be better off in a Chapter 7 even if the company as a unit
is more valuable in a Chapter 11 setting.
Section 1114 also changes the incentives of retirees. A new hypo-
thetical illustrates this change in incentive. A company, for whatever
reason, simply has no going-concern surplus;8 6 it is worth five hundred
183. The nonretiree unsecured creditors would have the ability to block the plan by voting
against it because each of these creditors would not be receiving as much in the plan as each would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor. See supra note 157.
184. The calculation would be as follows. The Chapter 7 liquidation would yield a total of
$300 million. The secured creditors would receive $100 million of that total, leaving $200 million
for the retirees and the other unsecured creditors. Because these claims together total $500 million
($200 million for retirees and $300 million for other unsecureds), the $200 million would be enough
to pay 40% of those claims.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 158-79.
186. The purpose of Chapter 11 is not necessarily to see every business reorganized. Rather,
it aims to reorganize companies that in fact have going-concern value worth preserving. See Baird
& Jackson, supra note 10, at 109 (stating that the "firm should be kept intact only if it has more
value as a going concern than liquidated"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988) (providing that
one prerequisite to confirmation of a plan is that the company is capable of preservation as a going
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million dollars if liquidated piecemeal in a Chapter 7 case but is worth
only three hundred million dollars as a going concern. The members of
the company's management, in a desperate attempt to keep their jobs,
file a Chapter 11 petition for reorganization. Secured creditors are owed
one hundred million dollars, nonretiree unsecured creditors are owed
three hundred million dollars, and retirees have been promised future
benefits with a discounted present value of two hundred million dollars.
There is also a class of stockholders. In this example, the retirees will
want the case to stay in Chapter 11 as long as possible even if their
accountant tells them the stark facts about the company's lack of a go-
ing-concern surplus. As long as the company is in Chapter 11, the retir-
ees will receive a preferred position compared with other unsecured
creditors. Once the case is converted to a Chapter 7, however, the retir-
ees lose that priority and share pro rata with the rest of the unsecured
creditors.8 7 Thus, section 1114 sets up a situation in which the retirees
will have a perverse incentive to "bleed away" the assets of the estate to
the detriment of the creditor group even in such an admittedly fruitless
Chapter 11 effort.
D. Objections to "Bankruptcy-Only" Priorities
In addition to preservation of going-concern value, another funda-
mental goal of bankruptcy is "equality of treatment.' ' 188 Unlike most
state-law systems, in which the spoils go to the swiftest creditor, the
bankruptcy forum treats like creditors alike. The base line for deter-
mining which creditors are "like" for purposes of bankruptcy distribu-
tion is the creditors' relative positions under state law. 89 In other
words, because a fully perfected secured creditor will get paid before a
general unsecured creditor under state law, the same result generally
occurs in bankruptcy. Similarly, subordinated creditors under state law
do not collect their claims in bankruptcy until unsubordinated creditors
have been paid.
There are some exceptions to the above principle. Section 507 con-
tains a number of categories of claimants whose rights are greater in
bankruptcy than they are outside bankruptcy. 90 Most of these priori-
concern).
187. This result would be true unless a court accepted the more expansive definition of §
1114's administrative expense priority. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
188. See, e.g., NLRB v. Martin Asham Sewing Co., 873 F.2d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1989) (assert-
ing that the theme of bankruptcy is equality of distribution); see also Protection Act Hearing,
supra note 46, at 52 (statement of Kenneth N. Klee) (noting that equality of distribution is one of
the three major principles of bankruptcy).
189. See supra note 155.
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
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ties, however, are limited to fairly modest dollar amounts. 1" Even then,
many critics argue that a proliferation of such special priorities in bank-
ruptcy tends to thwart the effectiveness of the bankruptcy process.192
Giving certain classes of creditors priorities in bankruptcy that
they do not enjoy outside bankruptcy tends to have at least two detri-
mental consequences. First, it may give that class of creditors an incen-
tive to see its debtor in bankruptcy even when the company's problems
could be resolved more readily and cheaply outside bankruptcy. 93 Sec-
ond, the existence of a special priority in bankruptcy, particularly one
attaching to a very large claim, may make it more expensive for the
debtor to obtain credit.19 4
Some general observations about the role of the bankruptcy process
demonstrate the underpinnings of the first problem. Bankruptcy is a
costly procedural mechanism that should be used only in a case in
which creditors of the debtor cannot come to a consensual agreement.
One of the chief advantages that bankruptcy has over out-of-court
workouts is its coercive process. Unlike nonbankruptcy composition
agreements among creditors, bankruptcy is a collective proceeding in
which no creditor may choose to opt out. Notwithstanding this advan-
tage to the bankruptcy process, many companies could be reorganized
at less expense without court intervention. The first problem with sec-
tion 1114 is that it makes an out-of-court reorganization much more
unlikely because any proposed reduction in retiree benefits would
prompt retirees to force the company into Chapter 11, where retirees
would enjoy the priority position that they lack outside bankruptcy.
The second problem created by a significant bankruptcy-only pri-
ority such as that conferred by section 1114 is the debtor's reduced ac-
cess to credit markets. Any lenders that consider extending credit to a
company with large retiree insurance obligations will have to factor into
their interest rate the reduced return they will receive in bankruptcy
due to the subordination of their claim to that of the retirees. The dis-
incentive for creditors to lend created by section 1114 will loom largest
191. See, e.g., id. § 507(3)(B) (providing that special priority for prepetition wage claims is
limited to $2000 for each individual).
192. See Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 160 (testimony of Nathan B. Feinstein)
(indicating that "experience in Europe and elsewhere has been that engrafting welfare priorities
into the reorganization process has destroyed the process").
193. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (asserting that an important reason
for uniform treatment of property interests inside and outside bankruptcy is to discourage forum
shopping).
194. See Protection Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 85 (testimony of Prof. Lawrence P. King)
(suggesting that in prebankruptcy workouts, lenders will be more likely to forgo payments owed if
they can be assured of receiving a reasonable return if the debtor goes into Chapter 11); see also
id. at 122-23 (testimony of William J. Perlstein) (stating that postpetition unsecured credit is un-
likely if the Chapter 11 debtor is saddled with significant retiree benefits obligations).
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at the very time when the debtor needs credit the most. Section 1114
will cause the financially struggling debtor, desperately in need of a
cash infusion, to pay the largest premium for a loan, because the likeli-
hood of a lender facing the retirees' bankruptcy priority will be greatest
with just such a borrower.
A final troubling aspect to the administrative expense priority
given to retiree benefits in Chapter 11 cases is that there is nothing
about a retiree insurance expense that gives it the character of a tradi-
tional administrative expense. The first priority accorded to administra-
tive expenses is reserved generally for those creditors who have added
value to the debtor's estate.19 5 Administrative priority status attaches,
for example, to the rendering of postpetition services or the extension
of postpetition credit.196 While retirees at one time gave value to the
company for which they worked, that is true of all prepetition un-
secured creditors, none of whom qualify for an administrative expense
priority.197
VI. NONBANKRUPTCY SOLUTIONS
There are a number of possible ways to address the problems that
Congress purported to alleviate with the enactment of section 1114.
One possible approach would attach a federally created lien to the as-
sets of a company, both inside and outside bankruptcy, equal to the
amount of retiree insurance obligations owed by the company.198 This
method of giving retirees a priority over other creditors would be supe-
rior to section 1114 because it would remove two types of perverse in-
centives created by the operation of section 1114. First, other unsecured
creditors would not wish to force the company into Chapter 7 in any
case in which these creditors believed that the most efficient use of the
debtor's assets could be made in the Chapter 11 forum.'9 9 Second, retir-
ees would not have a perverse incentive to force their former company
into Chapter 11 in a case when an out-of-court workout would be the
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). But see Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 479 (1968)
(stating that a postpetition tort victim of a reorganizing entity is entitled to administrative priority
status for its damages claim).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 189-92. But see Commercial Law Hearing, supra
note 1, at 80 (testimony of Prof. Vern Countryman) (suggesting special treatment for retiree bene-
fits might be appropriate because current workers may be agreeing to work in part because retirees
are being paid benefits).
198. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 215(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (providing that the Secretary
of Labor has the ability to enjoin companies that fail to pay minimum wage from placing goods
into commerce, effectively giving workers a "lien" on goods for the amount of minimum wage
owed).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 180-85.
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best way to reorganize the business." ' The federal statutory lien ap-
proach is not without its drawbacks. Such a lien would have a detri-
mental effect on the availability of credit for companies whose retiree
benefits liabilities are substantial. If section 1114 causes lenders to
charge a premium for loans to businesses that have large retiree liabili-
ties, a retiree benefits lien that operated in all cases would make such a
premium that much greater. In many cases, the existence of such a fed-
eral lien would discourage the extension of all credit.
Another possible approach to the retiree benefits dilemma is a con-
gressional mandate that companies must prefund retiree benefits pro-
grams, as under ERISA. The drawback to this method is that many
employers would discontinue providing the benefit if such a program
meant that they would be forced to prefund it.201 Furthermore, those
companies that did retain their programs probably would have to pay
lower salaries once they recognized the true cost of this form of de-
ferred compensation. Finally, the administration and enforcement of
federally mandated prefunding would entail new costs, a lesson this
country has learned since the advent of ERISA. 2 Notwithstanding all
of these costs, an ERISA-type mechanism is probably the only realistic
way to address the true underlying cause of the retiree benefits crisis:
lack of funding. Although regulation of retiree benefits prefunding
would be a more expensive prospect for the federal government than
the new bankruptcy legislation, Congress could take advantage of the
ERISA structure that is already in place as the vehicle for ensuring em-
ployer compliance.
Certainly many companies would respond to a prefunding require-
ment by dropping retiree medical programs altogether. With the ad-
vent, however, of the FASB proposal for forcing companies to show
retiree benefits liabilities on the balance sheet,203 those companies that
do not have a serious commitment to retiree insurance benefits most
likely will phase out such programs in any event.04 Furthermore, even
if some businesses discontinue postemployment benefits as a result of
such funding requirements, there is some benefit to forcing a company's
hand on the retirement insurance issue.
If employers are required to back up their retirement benefits
promises with funds earmarked for that purpose, those workers who are
200. See supra text accompanying notes 186 & 187.
201. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., LTV Hearing, supra note 3, at 64-67 (letter from Kathleen P. Utgoff, execu-
tive director, PBGC) (describing how PBGC is required to assume responsibility for guaranteed
benefits that the promising company underfunds).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
204. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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promised such benefits can be certain that the money will be available
to pay for the benefits when the workers retire. Employees who work
for companies that no longer offer such benefits to retirees can plan
their lives accordingly. For example, when these noncovered employees
consider the option of early retirement, they can evaluate realistically
whether the cost of pre-Medicare health coverage will make such a deci-
sion financially ill-advised.
The real tragedy of the current state of affairs is the surprise fac-
tor. The typical retiree who has been promised insurance benefits sim-
ply does not consider that the promise is contingent on the employer's
continued financial health. 05 Because the retiree has not considered the
potential frailty of the promise, he has not accounted, financially or
emotionally, for the possibility that the promise will be broken. If a
prefunding requirement means that fewer employers will make a retiree
insurance commitment, at least those companies making such commit-
ments will set aside the funds to meet those obligations as they come
due.
A newly enacted prefunding requirement would be too late for cur-
rent retirees; their hope of receiving retiree benefits rests on the contin-
ued financial health of their former employer. The retiree would want
the former employer to have open to it all possible avenues, both bank-
ruptcy and nonbankruptcy, for working through its financial difficulties.
A repeal of section 1114 would give these retirees greater assurance that
the party who promised them their retirement insurance benefits would
be ultimately in the best possible position to keep that promise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted by Congress as a
well-intentioned response to the crisis created for retirees when LTV
filed Chapter 11 and ceased paying retiree insurance premiums. Unfor-
tunately, the new bankruptcy provision is of dubious value to retirees.
Because Congress gave retirees a priority that attaches solely in a Chap-
ter 11 case, the retirees have no special protection either in a Chapter 7
liquidation or in a liquidation under state law.
Besides failing to give retirees any meaningful protection for their
postemployment insurance benefits, section 1114 creates an incentive
for other unsecured creditors to force a business to liquidate under
Chapter 7 even when the assets of the business would be deployed most
effectively in the Chapter 11 forum. Furthermore, the new Bankruptcy
Code section gives retirees a reason to want their former employer in
205. See, e.g., Retiree Health Benefits Hearings, supra note 10, at 8-11 (providing the testi-
mony of retirees whose medical insurance was discontinued suddenly).
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Chapter 11 even when the problems of the business could be resolved
best outside the bankruptcy reorganization process. Finally, the new
Bankruptcy Code section creates a significant additional source of
transactions costs in a Chapter 11 case that could prevent the success-
ful reorganization of companies that have a going-concern value worth
preserving.
The crisis surrounding retiree insurance benefits can be resolved
only with an approach that addresses the true underlying cause: lack of
prefunding. An ERISA-type prefunding requirement, despite its costs,
would give security for employees whose companies continued to offer
retiree insurance benefits. Furthermore, employees whose companies
chose to discontinue retiree insurance programs at least could plan for
their future with a realistic set of expectations concerning their postem-
ployment entitlements.

